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Cognitive and bodily selves :
How do they interact following brain lesion?
Y Rossetti, Nicholas P. Holmes, Gilles Rode, Alessandro Farné
Dualism has long distinguished between the mental and the body experiences. 
Probing the structure and organisation of the self traditionally calls for a distinction 
between these two sides of the self coin. It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to 
address these philosophical issues, and our starting point will be the simple 
distinction between reflective processes involved in the elaboration of body image, 
self awareness and self-recognition (i.e. ‘the self’) and the sensori-motor dialogues 
involved in action control, reactions and automatisms (i.e. ‘the body’ schema). This 
oversimplification does not take into account the complex interactions taking place 
between these two levels of description, but our initial aim will be to distinguish 
between them, before addressing the question of their interactions. Cognitive and 
sensori-motor processes have frequently been distinguished (review: Rossetti and 
Revonsuo 2000), and it may be proposed that a similar dissociation can be put 
forward, a priori, between a central representation of self and a bodily representation 
corresponding to body schema (Figure 1).
Body schema and body image
Human pathology often reveals dissociated deficits for cognitive and sensori-
motor representations. Jacques Paillard, among the firsts of many others (review in 
Rossetti 1998, Rossetti and Revonsuo 2000), provided a theoretical framework to 
distinguish between these two processes and reviewed empirical evidence for the 
distinction (e.g. Paillard 1985, 1987). From his initial sensori-motor area of research 
practice, which led him to emphasise the role of the moving body in the construction 
of spatial representations (Paillard 1971), he in turn exported the theoretical 
distinction into several other fields. His most important contribution to the exploration 
of the self has been his version of the distinction between body schema and body 
image (Paillard, 1980, 1982). His first account of the distinction was to translate the 
“what” and “where” dissociation emphasised in the visual system onto body 
representations (Paillard 1980), binding the classical psychological distinctions with 
modern neurophysiological data.
As argued by several authors (e.g., Head and Holmes, 1911; Paillard, 1999, 
2005) several aspects of body representation should be distinguished. Obviously one 
is able to make use of the skin information fed to the primary cortex to construct a  
“superficial  schema”. Then a “postural schema” is used to register all  changes of 
posture. This latter representation is now more often referred to as “Body schema” 
(Schindler, 1935). This level is considered to correspond to a low-level sensori-motor 
processing of body information prior to its conscious processing. The proper body 
image  (“l’image  du  corps”;  Lhermitte  1942)  refers  to  the  actual  conscious 
representation of information related to the body, not only of somatosensory but also 
of visual and motor origin. Beyond the physiological descriptions, further experiences 
of the body can be described. As proposed by F. Dolto for example, there are also 
unconscious levels of body image (“l’image inconsciente du corps”). These images 
refer to symbolic representations of one’s own body that are not directly linked to the 
low-level sensory inputs. As argued by Dolto, this unconscious body image is purely 
unconscious whereas the body schema is partly unconscious but also preconscious. 
She also delineates a “conscious body schema” which can be taken as an equivalent 
of the (conscious) body image defined by Lhermitte. Although they have not been 
investigated systematically  by  neuropsychological  approaches,  these unconscious 
representations inevitably play an important role in the organisation of the patient’s 
reactions  to  a  deficit.  The  dominant  account  of  these  distinctions  in  the  field  of  
cognitive  neuroscience  is  the  distinction  between  body  schema and  body  image 
(Paillard 1980, 1999, 2005).
Neurological arguments for the distinction
The key empirical argument used to argue for a double dissociation between 
body schema and body image comes from the comparison of central and peripheral 
deafferentation. As early as 1983, Jacques Paillard and colleagues published a 
paper on a centrally deafferented patient AT (Paillard et al. 1983). Following the 
discovery of blindsight, they similarly showed that this patient could not feel any 
tactile stimulus applied to her hand, but could nevertheless point with significant 
accuracy toward the stimulus. Paillard et al. interpreted their result as a dissociation 
between “what” (impaired) and “where” (preserved) processing in the somatosensory 
domain. This tactile equivalent to blindsight was further explored in a patient with a 
thalamic lesion leading to a complete somatosensory loss on the right side (Rossetti 
et al. 1995). As the previous case, this patient, JA, could not detect if a touch was 
applied to his arm, even in a forced-choice manner. And he remained able to point to 
the location of the stimulus with a well above chance performance. However, the 
patient could not show where he had been touched on a full-scale drawing of his own 
arm, demonstrating that the residual pointing ability could only be expressed when 
pointing where directed at the stimulus (Figure 2). Therefore it was concluded that 
the residual ability found in this patient did not pertain to ‘where’ processing but 
rather to ‘how’ processing. The common feature of the two patients was that they 
remained fully unaware of somatosensory stimuli but could express some residual 
processing via the sensori-motor representation provided by their body schema.
Paillard contrasted this finding with another patient, GL, who presented with a 
peripheral loss of somatosensory processing. In this patient, tactile and 
proprioceptive capacities were lost for long, and she has been extensively studied in 
to research on proprioceptive deafferentation. However she exhibited a residual 
thermal stimulus processing, which could be used to investigate her ability to locate 
stimuli applied to her body surface. Paillard first tested her capacity to locate thermal 
stimuli by pointing to her own body, a task in which she  performed randomly. Paillard 
then tested her ability to verbalize and to show on a picture of the body where she 
had been touched. On these tasks she proved to be very accurate in localising the 
stimulated site (Paillard, 2005). Paillard concluded that GL was able to locate the 
stimulus on her body, using a conscious body image, without being able to use the 
same information to drive stimulus oriented movements, i.e. she wasn’t able to 
incorporate this thermal stimulus in her body schema.
Taken together, these two neurological conditions suggested that there may 
be a double dissociation between the body schema and the body image (Paillard 
2005). However a number of points deserve discussion before this hypothesis can be 
validated. First, should the inability of GL to point at a cutaneous stimulus be 
attributed to a sensory or to a motor deficit? A proprioceptive deafferentation makes it 
difficult to locate the hand in space and hence to guide hand movement in the 
absence of visual feedback. The apparent failure to locate the stimulus on her body 
may be explained by a relatively low level motor control deficit rather than by a 
central representation problem. It would be crucial to know whether GL could show 
where the location of the stimulus was on her body once she could open her eyes.
Second, one may expect the higher level of body representation to be less 
prone to deterioration in the presence of a sensory deficit. The sensori-motor levels 
should be directly and immediately affected by sensory loss, but the higher level 
should exhibit more inertia. As a matter of fact, JA had a recent stroke causing his 
deficit while GL presented her deficit for over 10 years. [NOT CLEAR WHAT THIS 
LAST SENTENCE MEANS OR WHY IT'S IMPORTANT FOR THIS DISTINCTION]
Third, it seems necessary to further define or assess whether localising a 
stimulus on a body map is representative of the body image. This point is reminiscent 
of Gordon Holmes’ [OTHERWISE IT COULD BE NP HOLMES] classification 
including a superficial schemata in-between the body schema and the body image 
levels of processing [G HOLMES DIDN'T TALK ABOUT THE BODY IMAGE 
DIRECTLY, SO I DON'T UNDERSTAND THIS POINT]. As pointed out by Paillard 
himself, it is interesting that this superficial representation was defined as a schema, 
just like the body schema, and not like an image. Can we simply consider that 
pointing directly to a superficial stimulus activates the body schema whereas pointing 
to a body map activates the body image? In patients with higher-level body 
representation problems sych as auto-topoagnosia, the deficit exhibited by the 
patients does not seem to correspond to a simple body schema deficit, and 
accordingly their simple actions are not altered (Felician et al. 2003).
Fourth, and more theoretically, several types of interaction have been 
described between the so called dissociated levels (cf. Rossetti 1998, Rossetti and 
Pisella 2002).
Self schema and self image
The above questions emphasise the need for clarification before clear 
conclusions can be drawn about a clear separation of body schema and body image. 
As a matter of fact, correlates of self perception can be searched for either at the 
level of body schema or at the level of body image. At the methodological level, it 
should be stressed that, since the body schema is involved in sensori-motor 
interactions, it is important to distinguish between its sensory and motor aspects. 
Interestingly, most of the empirical studies performed to explore the sense of 
ownership or agency have relied on action paradigms, both in healthy participants 
and in neurological or psychiatric patients. Most of these studies concluded that there 
was a bias in favour of self recognition of other’s movements or body parts (e.g. 
Daprati et al. 1997; van der Bos and Jeannerod 2002; Farrer et al. 2003). One crucial 
methodological question about these approaches is about whether they tested for 
sensory-motor or inter-sensory difference detection capacities, i.e. a self shema, or 
for a proper self representation, i.e. a self image? This question calls for using 
different paradigms, relying on a different question, in order to eliminate this possible 
bias. A compelling conclusion of these sensorimotor studies is nevertheless that 
there is a bias for ‘self’ response in all categories of subjects. However it is known for 
long that patients with Anton-Babinski syndrome show the opposite trend: they 
typically deny ownership of their own upper or lower left limb. We have therefore 
investigated the sense of hand ownership with a simple, but original paradigm (see 
also Frassinetti et al. 2008).
In the absence of brain damage, recognising your own body, and particularly 
your own hands, is a trivially simple thing that seems to require very little effort. We 
are typically always aware of both where our hands are in space, and of the fact that 
the hands we see and feel in front of us are ours. the ability to recognise and 
perceive our own body can be lost or impaired following brain damage, resulting in, 
for example, somatoparaphrenia (e.g., Rode et al., 1992). The fact that this ability 
(i.e., self-recognition) can be impaired by brain damage suggests that it depends on 
the operation of a particular brain area which is specialised for self-recognition, and is 
damaged in those patients with somatoparaphrenia. Alternatively, self-recognition 
may depend on other brain areas that are not damaged in these patients, but the loss 
of sensory and motor information related to the hand (e.g., visual, tactile, 
proprioceptive, efference copy), forces the self-recognition system into a 
conservative state of 'denial' – the brain reasons that 'if I don't have sufficient sensory 
information to feel ownership over a particular body part, then it can't be mine'.
We tested this idea in healthy participants. We photographed the left and right 
hands of participants in both a palm-down and a palm-up posture, then presented the 
images to them on screen, intermixed with similar photographs of other participants' 
hands (matched for sex, hand-size, and gross surface features such as skin tone and 
hairiness). We manipulated the duration that the hand stimuli were displayed on 
screen, and backward-masked them with an image of scrambled hand-parts (Figure 
3). The rationale was to examine how well healthy participants can recognise their 
own hands (i.e. responding 'mine' or 'not mine') when the available information about 
the visible hands is decreased to the point that the stimulus is barely visible.
When the visual stimuli were on-screen for 67ms or longer, healthy 
participants could recognise their own hands better than chance, and displayed no 
systematic biases in their responding (i.e. they were just as good at saying an image 
of their own hand was theirs, as saying that an image of another person's hand was 
not theirs. By contrast, when the visual stimuli were presented for 33ms, participants 
performed significantly above chance levels, but their responses became more 
conservative – they began to 'disown' the hand images, and typically responded 'not 
mine'. With only 17ms of stimulus presentation, performance was at chance levels, 
and participants' strategy became even more conservative. Participants responded 
about 70% of the time 'not mine', even when they were repeatedly informed that half 
of the stimuli were photographs of their own hands, and half of other peoples' hands 
(Figure 4).
How does this relate to somatoparaphrenia and related disorders? It seems 
that healthy participants are very likely to 'disown' static images of their hands when 
they do not have sufficient sensory information to make a confident ownership 
decision: They become more conservative in making explicit ownership judgements. 
These healthy subjects seem to have an intact mechanism for recognising their own 
hands, since they performed above chance performance with just 33ms of visual 
information, but they systematically erred towards denial of ownership when the 
available sensory information was impoverished. The implications for studying self-
recognition in neglect, anosognosia, or somatoparaphrenia are that we need to rule 
out the possibility that patients are simply adopting a conservative strategy when 
denying ownership or disease in their affected limbs. The mechanism responsible for 
self-recognition may be perfectly intact, but when deprived of sensory input from the 
affected limbs, it assumes a conservative criterion and denies ownership over the 
limb. Preliminary experiments on patients with unilateral neglect suggest that this 
conservative criterion may be increased, which is compatible with the classical 
description of patients with Anton-Babinski syndrome (Rode et al. 1992). However 
further experiments are needed to assess whether this finding can be generalised 
across neglect patients with various degrees of severity.
The apparent hierarchy between body image and body schema
When cognitive and sensorimotor levels of processing are distinguished, most 
emphasis is put on the top-down controls exerted by the higher cognitive level on the 
more primitive sensorimotor processes (review: Rossetti 1998, Rossetti and 
Revonsuo 2000). In short, all types of hierarchical control seem be to applied to the 
sensorimotor level: it can be configured, activated or inhibited by the cognitive 
supervisor (Rossetti 1998, see figure 5). In the case of body schema and body 
image, a similar description can be proposed (Rossetti et al. 2005). If one considers 
the case of numbsense described above, three types of control can be observed. 
First, as is the case in blindsight, the patients cannot make a spontaneous use of the 
stimulus. They have to be precisely instructed about what dimension of the stimulus 
will be varied and what is the expected responses they will have to make. These 
instruction allow the patient to configure sensorimotor transformations to 
appropriately process the unfelt stimulus. Second, the patients have to be told when 
the response is to be made, as they don’t detect the stimulus. This go signal is 
required to activate the sensorimotor transformation process while the stimulus is 
available. Third, any attempt to activate a higher level computation of the response 
will impose its (empty) representation on the sensorimotor process and disrupt its 
performance. For example, activating a simultaneous cognitive representation of the 
tactile stimulus inherent to a verbal answer has been shown to disrupt the action-
numbsense capacities (Rossetti 1998, Rossetti et al. 2001, Rossetti and Pisella 
2002). This phenomenon is depicted in Figure 6. The performance obtained in the 
sensori-motor pointing task already shown on Figure 2 dropped down to chance level 
when the simultaneous verbal response was required. In the same way, the 
introduction of a delay between the application of the stimulus and the pointing 
response produces a decrease in performance which reached chance level after 2 
seconds for tactile stimuli and after 4 seconds for proprioceptive judgements 
(Rossetti 1998, Rossetti et al 2000, 2001, Rossetti and Pisella 2002, 2003). These 
results suggest that the higher level cognitive level of stimulus representation 
interferes negatively with the elementary sensori-motor processing.
It is obvious that, in the case of numbsense, these cognitive and sensori-motor 
levels of stimulus processing can be connected to the notions of body schema and 
body image, and this confirms Paillard’s view that body image and body schema can 
be dissociated (Paillard 1999). If one accepts this idea, then one may be tempted to 
set body image in a position higher than body schema within the hierarchy of body 
representations, as depicted in Figure 1.
The above results show that is is clearly and logically a top-down influence of 
cognitive representations on sensori-motor processing of somatosensory stimuli. 
However a reciprocal influence has been demonstrated as well. A very spectacular 
effect has been initially revealed by Rubens and by Cappa (1987) in patients with 
unilateral neglect.
Unilateral neglect and body representation
After having been interpreted as a mere sensory deficit, unilateral neglect is 
now considered as a deficit of conscious access to information coming from the 
contra-lesional side of space (e.g. Driver and Mattingley, 2001; Vallar et al., 2003). 
Neglect is mostly found following a lesion of the right hemisphere, which causes a 
deficit for the left side. The deficit observed in unilateral neglect applies both to body 
space and extra-personal space. Neglect patients typically exhibit inattention to 
sensory stimuli, and several aspects of their body schema appear to be impaired as 
well. External neglect is manifested for stimuli delivered in any sensory modality, 
although it has been mainly studied in the visual domain. Patients just appear to be 
omitting the items that are presented to their left (Figure 7 & 8). They may present 
with sustained eye and head deviations to the right or estimate the straight-ahead 
direction to be shifted to the right. They may produce slower movements to the left 
and even progressively omit to move the left hand during bimanual tapping. In 
addition, their body image can be affected as well. They may show anosognosia, i.e. 
the lack of awareness for a left-sided deficit such as hemiplegia, or even 
somatoparaphrenia, i.e. a delusion about their own body, especially about their 
neglected side.
There is no available direct evidence for a dissociation between body schema 
and body image in unilateral neglect. However several studies have shown that these 
patients are more impaired for perceptual tasks than for visuo-motor tasks. For 
example, they may be strongly biased when requested to indicate the middle of a 
stick with their finger, but they are relatively less impaired when the task is simply to 
grasp the object (e.g. Robertson et al. 1995). In this latter case, they show a better 
ability to locate implicitly the centre of the stick for the purpose of grasping. This, 
among other arguments, suggests that the lower-level visuo-motor functions may be 
relatively spared in unilateral neglect. Interestingly unilateral neglect patients may 
exhibit a deficit of both egocentric reference frames used for action and for self body 
perception. It is classical that patients with severe neglect have difficulties in 
representing their own body, as their left half is typically strongly neglected. As 
detailed in the next section of this chapter, personal neglect may include deficits 
ranging from an impoverishment of the representation of one side of the body to a 
distortion of the representation of the whole body. These higher-order deficits 
contrast with the preserved visuo-motor abilities and are compatible with the view 
that neglect is primarily a deficit of the conscious access and use of information. 
Higher-order alterations of body-image are exhibited by some neglect patients. 
Anosognosia and somatoparaphrenia are usually associated with severe neglect. 
The important point here is that these body-image deficits may not be systematically 
accompanied by an alteration of the body schema. Therefore the classical 
conception of a hierarchical domination of cognitive processes upon visuo-motor 
interactions (e.g. Rossetti, 1998; Pisella & Rossetti, 2000) is not supported by the 
case of neglect.
Bottom-up effects: Unilateral neglect and vestibular stimulation
Cappa et al. (1987) reported an improvement of anosognosia through 
vestibular stimulation in two of four right brain-damaged patients who also showed an 
extrapersonal and personal neglect. One patient (case 3) during the immediate and 
delayed post-stimulation assessments admitted that his left hand was weaker than 
the right only after specific inquiry, although he persisted in denying any deficit in the 
lower limb. By contrast, the second patient only acknowledged the motor deficits 
(upper and lower limbs) immediately after stimulation when questioned specifically, 
and spontaneously after 15 minutes said: “I don’t know why, I have always been able 
to move them, but now they are blocked: it is as if my brain is no longer able to 
command them.” This behavioural change was still present in the following days. In 
two patients, improvement of anosognosia was associated with transitory 
improvement of extrapersonal and personal neglect.
Bisiach et al. (1991) reported the effects of vestibular stimulation on the 
somatoparaphrenic delusion showed by a patient suffering from a fronto-temporo-
parietal infarction in the right hemisphere. Before stimulation, when the examiner 
pointed to the patient’s left arm and asked whose arm is this, she answered: “It’s not 
mine. It’s my mother’s. I found it in my bed; since the first day. Feel, it’s warmer than 
mine.” Under caloric vestibular stimulation, the patient recognized that same arm as 
her own, but two hours later, the patient had completely relapsed in her full-blown 
delusion. The same stimulation was repeated twice and the results of vestibular 
activation were identical to those obtained in the first tests, confirming the possibility 
of an experimental manipulation of a body image deficit by a peripheral stimulation.
Rode et al. (1992) reported a similar partial remission of anosognosia and 
somatoparaphrenic delusion in a rare case of long lasting anosognosia consecutive 
to a large cortico-subcortical stroke of the right cerebral hemisphere including the 
parieto-temporo-occipital junction. Neurological examination performed 6 months 
post-onset disclosed a complete left hemiplegia, a left hemianaesthesia and a left 
apparent total hemianopia on confrontation. Head and gaze were permanently 
deviated to the right and the patient showed a severe extrapersonal and personal 
neglect. Anosognosia for hemiplegia and hemianopia was complete. The patient 
claimed that she was able to walk without any problem and did not understand why 
she was in hospital. She even accused her husband for having brought her there and 
asked over and over to go home. When an examiner brought the patient’s left arm in 
her good visual field and asked whose it was, she answered: “It isn’t mine. I found it 
in the bathroom, when I fell. It’s not mine because it is too heavy. It must be yours.” 
When asked where her own arm was, she answered: ‘Behind the door’. Following a 
left cold ear irrigation, a temporary and complete remission of anosognosia and 
somatoparaphrenia were observed. The patient was totally aware of her hemiplegia. 
When asked if she could move her arm, she answered:’No’ and asked why, she said: 
“Because I have suffered from a hemiplegia. I was in my bathroom and I fell. I called 
my niece and I was taken to the hospital”. When the examiner brought her left arm in 
her good field, she recognized it as hers and no longer claimed it was the examiner’s. 
Surprisingly a temporary remission of the left motor deficit was also observed after 
vestibular stimulation.
Rode et al. (1998) assessed in the same patients the effects of vestibular 
stimulation on both anosognosia for hemiplegia and hemiplegia itself. Caloric 
vestibular stimulation (i.e. the irrigation of the left external ear canal with cold water) 
temporarily improved left-sided motor deficits in seven out of nine right brain-
damaged patients. Neglect for the left side of the body (personal neglect) fully 
recovered in eight patients, and improved in one patient. All patients had exhibited 
anosognosia in the acute post-stroke stage, but the deficit was still present at the 
time of the vestibular stimulation study in six out of nine patients. Anosognosia 
completely recovered in five out of these six patients. These results were replicated 
by Vallar et al. (2003) in four right-brain damage patients examined within 24 hours 
after stroke onset. All patients had a left homonymous hemianopia and 
hemianaesthesia, and exhibited a severe visuo-spatial neglect, as assessed by 
bisection and cancellation tasks. All four patients had a severe motor deficit in the 
upper limb, which was temporarily improved by vestibular stimulation. In all four 
patients, temporary recovery of the muscle strength deficit paralleled recovery from 
anosognosia. Personal neglect appears to be unrelated to anosognosia for the left-
sided motor deficit, being present in only two out of four patients.
These data showed that vestibular stimulation may temporarily improve both 
anosognosia for motor deficits and the motor deficits themselves, suggesting that 
when a deficit become less severe, due to the positive effects of the stimulation, 
patients become aware of the motor deficit. Recovery from anosognosia for 
hemiplegia after vestibular stimulation may result from the regression of a motor 
planning deficit, which itself contributes to the clinical manifestations of hemiparesis 
or hemiplegia (Vallar et al., 1993). An alternative view may be to consider that 
vestibular stimulation could act on the body schema[THE 'BODY SCHEMA' IS A 
REPRESENTATION OF THE BODY, SO A 'BODY SCHEMA REPRESENTATION' 
IS A REPRESENTATION OF A REPRESENTATION OF THE BODY – NOT VERY 
USEFUL FOR A BRAIN!], especially on the left part of body space representation.
Among the previous cases several exhibited a restoration of body schema 
through vestibular stimulation that was only transient. Nevertheless, this was 
sufficient to permit higher effects on body image consciousness. In the case reported 
by Bisiach et al. (1991), these effects have even been repeated after successive left 
cold ear irrigation. The restoration of body schema  involved, at each time, a better 
evocation of explicit knowledge of the left hemibody and deficits located to it. A 
peripheral stimulation may thus favour “bottom-up” interactions between body 
schema and body image, between an implicit sensorimotor level and higher explicit 
level of body space representation, between primary perception and a modular 
thought-process.
Bottom-up effects: Unilateral neglect and prism adaptation
As the body schema provides the basis for sensori-motor coordination, one 
may speculate that other techniques known to alter this coordination may affect body 
schema as well. One interesting aspect of sensorimotor relationships is that they are 
highly susceptible to adaptive processes. Simple reaching behaviour can be adapted 
to dramatic changes of the relationship between the body and its environment. For 
example people can adapt to left-right or up-down reversal of the visual field within a 
few days (e.g. Sekiyama et al., 2000). A simpler technique, used extensively for 
about a century to investigate the plasticity of sensorimotor correspondences, 
consists of simply shifting the visual field to one side of space with prisms (for a 
review,  Redding et al. 2005). This visual shift produces dramatic consequences on 
the reaching behaviour of the subject exposed to the goggles, but the adaptation to 
this condition can be obtained much faster than for the more complex visual 
manipulations mentioned above. Prism adaptation is a simple procedure but its 
effects are more complex than it seems and the actual development of adaptation is 
conditioned by a few parameters (Redding et al., 2005). For example, pointing to 
visual targets without sight of the arm must be controlled following the exposure to 
the prisms. This parameter is modified in predictable ways depending on the 
direction of the visual shift and can witness resulting modifications of the body 
schema. One very interesting connection between prism adaptation and spatial 
neglect is that prism adaptation can also produce a shift in manual straight-ahead 
demonstrations in a direction opposite to the visual shift, just like has been described 
in some patients with spatial neglect (Jeannerod & Rossetti, 1993). If a normal 
individual is exposed to right deviating prisms, he will exhibit a leftward deviation of 
his straight-ahead demonstration, and the opposite is true for left-deviating prisms. 
One may therefore wonder whether the egocentric reference of patients with spatial 
neglect could be altered by prism adaptation, and whether a hypothetical shift can be 
accompanied by an improvement of other neglect symptoms. Initially based on the 
theory stating that neglect was attributed to a shift of the egocentric reference frame 
that is demonstrable by manual straight-ahead demonstrations, we have investigated 
the effect of prism adaptation in neglect patients. We have initially demonstrated that 
the egocentric reference of the neglect patients, when tested through straight-ahead 
pointing, could be improved following adaptation (Rossetti et al., 1998). Then it was 
shown that visuo-manual (Rossetti et al., 1998; Pisella et al., 2002; Farnè et al., 
2002; McIntosh et al., 2002; Frassinetti et al., 2002), visuo-ocular (Dijkerman et al., 
2003), non-visual (imagery: Rode et al., 1999, 2001; touch: Maravita et al., 2003; 
auditory: Jacquin-Courtois, 2010), non-manual (posture: Tilikete et al., 2001; wheel-
chair driving: Jacquin-Courtois, 2009) and even a non explicitly spatial task such as 
number bisection (Rossetti et al., 2004) could be improved following adaptation to the 
visuo-manual conflict induced by wedge prisms (reviews: Rossetti & Rode, 2002; 
Rode et al., 2003; Pisella et al. 2006). It should be emphasised here that awareness 
of the visual shift is not a necessary ingredient for prism adaptation. On the contrary, 
conditions preventing the subjects from being aware of the visual shift have been 
shown to produce stronger adaptation (Michel, 2003). In our experience, neglect 
patients never exhibited signs of awareness of the visual manipulation, even when 
specifically asked – whereas healthy controls show an immediate and strong 
reaction. In addition, the patients show no vegetative reactions (as assessed by skin 
conductance) to the introduction of prisms during a simple pointing task (Calabria et 
al., 2004). These arguments converge towards the idea that prism adaptation is 
acting at the physiological rather than the cognitive level, i.e. directly at the level of 
sensori-motor coordination that pertains to the body schema. This also shows that 
higher-level cognition is embodied to such extent that the apparently irrelevant 
plasticity of visuo-manual coordination is capable of altering at least several aspects 
of it (Figure 9). The logical consequence of this is that some of the sensori-motor 
effects of prism adaptation (e.g., postural balance: Tilikete et al., 2001; wheel-chair 
driving: Jacquin et al., 2009) are interpreted as indirect effects resulting from the top-
down control of the corresponding function resulting from the bottom-up influence of 
visuo-manual adaptation on central representations (Rossetti et al., 1999; Rossetti & 
Rode 2002; Rode et al., 2003; Pisella et al. 2006).
Conclusions
We have reviewed here the body representation deficits exhibited by patients 
with intrinsic somatosensory deficits and unilateral neglect. We have tried to apply 
the concepts of body schema and body image to these conditions and attempted to 
delineate their behavioural correlates in trying to question their dissociability and 
interactions. Taken altogether, these clinical cases reveal that it is possible to 
dissociate between symptoms pertaining to each level of body representation, even if 
these two concepts [WHICH CONCEPTS? YOU MEAN REPRESENTATIONS?] may 
not suffice to reflect the inherent complexity of these representation processes 
[WHICH PROCESSES?]. Then, the issue of the interaction between a higher level 
body image and an elementary body schema has been addressed in a way that 
revealed both the expected top-down influences and more surprising bottom-up 
influences that can be used for rehabilitation purposes. We conclude that, despite an 
apparent simplicity, the relationship between body schema and body image is rich in 
reciprocal influences. One can speculate that the existence of these interactions in 
patients with impairment of at least one of the two levels is indicative of even richer 
interactions taking place in the healthy brain.
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Figure captions
Figure 1 : Distinguishing between two levels of body representation
Schematic depiction of the relationship between central cognitive processes linked to 
self formation and sensori-motor dialogues operating at the body interface. The level 
of alteration linked to central and peripheral deafferentation and to unilateral neglect 
are shown (derived from Rossetti et al. 2005)
Figure 2: Numbsense
Pointing performance of patient JA in response to tactile stimuli (stars) delivered on 
the forearm. Black dots show the correct responses, which are well above the 
chance level in the direct pointing condition and just around chance level in the 
pointing on an arm drawing condition.
Figure 3
Healthy participants were presented with images of their own or of another persons' 
hands on screen for between 17 and 533ms, followed by a mask of scrambled hands 
for 200ms. Participants were required to make explicit 'mine' versus 'not mine' 
responses using two mouse buttons, and were informed that half of the stimuli would 
be their hands, and half other persons' hands.
Figure 4
Percentage of errors made in an explicit self-recognition task in healthy subjects as a 
function of stimulus presentation duration for images of the participants own hands 
('self' – squares) and of other people's hands ('other' – circles). For stimulus 
presentation of less than 67ms, participants adopted a conservative response 
criterion, and consistently responded 'not mine' (i.e., they made many errors for their 
own hands, but few errors for other peoples' hands).
Figure 5: interactions between body image and body schema
Top-down  controls  exerted  by  cognitive  levels  on  sensori-motor  processing  may 
include configuration, activation and inhibition (Pisella & Rossetti,  2000). However 
when longer time scales are considered, such that plasticity can take place, bottom-
up influences arising from the basic sensori-motor interactions may structure higher 
levels. We propose that this also applies to the relationship between body schema 
and body image. (inspired from Rossetti 1998 & Rossetti et al. 2005)
Figure 6: Cognitive interference on body schema
Action-numbsense in patient JA when a simultaneous verbal representation of the 
stimulus is activated: the performance dropped to chance level.
Figure 7: unilateral neglect 
A: two colouring tests performed by neglect patients.
B: clock drawing by a patient.
C: example of body image disturbance.
D: gardening task: the patient was asked to distribute the yellow flowers over the 
entire surface of the green grass in a homogeneous way.
Figure 8: unilateral neglect and vestibular stimulation
The mental imagery capacity of a neglect patient is depicted before and immediately 
after vestibular stimulation.
Figure 9: Unilateral neglect and prism adaptation
Glasses, pointing table, and wheel-chair driving performance of a patient before and 
after prism adaptation.
